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Groundless grounds is all we have ever had, which proves their adequacy. 
Lee Braver, 2014, p. 215 
 
The modern scientific project aimed to get things right using proper names that could be mapped 
on to foundational knowledge, yielding what Hillary Putnam (1981) critiqued as an unattainable 
“God’s eye view” of reality. Both born in 1889, both initially seduced by a philosophical dream 
of articulating foundational reality, and each to become one of the 20th century’s most influential 
philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger are typically regarded as having very 
different philosophical projects, though each attacked science’s purported “ground.” Wittgen-
stein, protégé of Bertrand Russell, took logical positivism to what many saw as its analytical 
apex, only to later quite publicly abandon this approach for a view of meaning grounded in 
“language games.” Heidegger, protégé of Edmund Husserl who had been aiming to make a 
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science of subjectivity with his phenomenology, reformulated subjectivity as “being,” invoking 
temporal, contextual, relational engagements and performances. In their respective intellectual 
journeys, both Wittgenstein and Heidegger took head on the notion that science and philosophy 
could correctly name and map the foundations of reality.  
 
My personal interest in Braver’s (2014) Groundless Grounds relates to how interpretive ideas 
can be adapted to frontline helping practices. I have grown increasingly concerned about how 
philosophy of science arguments keep being used to suppress an interpretive and relational 
approach to practice (e.g., Strong & Busch, 2013). Modern “R”ealist science is alive and well, 
promising practitioners and the public that human problems can be correctly named and mapped 
on to foundational knowledge from which prescriptive solutions are warranted. Underpinning 
scientific arguments of this kind is a view that objective (i.e., untainted by human meaning and 
contact, see Daston & Galison, 2007), knowledge is obtainable and should trump any forms of 
knowing developed through human interaction. This particular philosophy of science is antithet-
ical to any notion that interpretive, relational work could be ethical, valid, or helpful. Without 
strong counter-arguments to bolster an interpretive and relational approach to helping, such 
notions of helpfulness can seem easily discreditable in these days of evidence-based practice. 
Needed by the modern science approach, it seems, are “how-to” scripts and foundational 
knowledge to guide one’s helping; less important are the pragmatic immediacies of humans 
relating and understanding. My understanding of the postmodern and social constructionist 
upheavals in late 20th century human science and service work was that different, relational 
grounds were becoming accessible to family and narrative therapists like myself. However, in 
the early stages of self-identifying in this way, I felt inadequately grounded in interpretive ideas 
that could shore up a compatible philosophy of science that supported this approach to practice, 
and so I read (Lock & Strong, 2010). My reading inevitably brought me to Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger as key thinkers whose ideas had applicability to my preferred ways of practice.     
  
Lee Braver’s Groundless Grounds is an ambitious and groundbreaking volume for making 
rigorous comparisons of two intellectual giants seldom juxtaposed. This would not be a good 
introductory book to the thinking of either Wittgenstein or Heidegger (see Monk, 1990 or 
Richardson 2012, for their respective biographies), and is targeted more for those who have been 
rewarded by reading Wittgenstein’s (1953) Philosophical Investigations or Heidegger’s (1962) 
Being and Time. As any reader of their books can tell you, the challenging prose of each book is 
compounded by the counter-intuitiveness of their revolutionary ideas. Many readers are unaware 
of how steeped they are in the foundational grounding of modern science, that reading either 
(later) Wittgenstein or Heidegger can initially leave them feeling their intelligence is being 
insulted, until unrecognized, bedrock assumptions, get dislodged with vertigo-inducing conse-
quences. It is the comprehensiveness and brilliance with which both Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
took on their respective philosophical projects that makes them the 20th century’s most influen-
tial philosophers. Braver’s project, which in my estimation succeeds well, is to bridge what each 
thinker was doing, finding parallels in Wittgenstein and Heidegger where former scholars saw 
distinct, possibly incommensurable, ideas and approaches.   
 
Braver helps readers move through some of the most obvious parallels accessibly and informa-
tively. While Wittgenstein launched his philosophizing down the foundational path with his 
analytic philosophy classic, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he abandoned this direction be-
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cause of its idealizations, and lack of hubris (philosophers cannot articulate a foundational Ur-
language of science). Like Heidegger (though there is only one cited instance of Wittgenstein 
mentioning him at a meeting of the Vienna Circle), both turned to how people did everyday life 
using means and terms that were real - for them. Each philosopher adopted an anthropological 
stance, focusing on in many cases what Polanyi (1967) would refer to as the “tacit dimension” of 
everyday life. In particular each was interested in how life was performed meaningfully (i.e., for 
the people so engaged) in taken for granted interactions. This interest is a striking departure from 
the atomistic views of prior thinkers, that discrete essences of meaning could be severed from the 
activities in which they find their immediate relevance and significance, and studied as founda-
tional knowledge of material reality. Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger took up linguistic views 
of meaning based on how words were used, as moves in “language games” (Wittgenstein) or as 
“equipment” in teleological activities (Heidegger). Most important, however, for Braver, is their 
antifoundationalism. 
 
It was this turn away from discoverable foundations which has drawn the greatest heat from 
critics. Charges of relativism and nihilistic semanticism have been the usual first line of attack on 
those taking up the ideas of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. It is, however, precisely here that a new 
kind of grounding – a socio-cultural grounding – is central to the arguments of both thinkers. The 
grounds are participatory, relational interactions that, over time, acquire the force of habit, 
customs to which we hold ourselves and each other.  This extends to the language we communi-
cate in our interactions, situated evaluations of what is proper or good, and the (“foundation-
shaking”) disruptions caused when our interactions defy custom and expectation. The human 
world both Wittgenstein and Heidegger were pointing to cannot be atomized, its meanings and 
customs obtain through agreement and trusting perpetuation. There is a difference being inside 
and engaged with this human world than there could ever be if one took seriously the abstract, 
“objectively detached,” claims of the modern foundationalists, as Braver (2014) underscores: 
 
This groundlessness would make thought viciously circular were we trying to enter it 
from the outside – if, that is, starting from the epistemological veil of ignorance, we were 
to try justifying the principle of seeking reasons. Fortunately, being has “graced” us by 
“throwing” us into this circle in the first place…Thrownness is a gift that enables, not an 
existential burden that compromises. (p. 202) 
 
Braver is a clear and gifted writer, well up to the task of communicating the overlaps and com-
plements he invites readers to find in the thinking of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, who, in his 
colourful prose, “dig up Descartes to kill him off” (p. 8) or were “weaning us off the hunger for 
explanations” (p. 152). He is not without mild criticism for either writer, seeing in Heidegger, for 
example, an obsession with phenomenological writing about “being” (Braver: “even a committed 
Heideggerian like myself must concede that his chronic invocations of being can approach self-
parody, a kind of ontological Tourette’s syndrome”, 2014, p. 130). Wittgenstein imports an 
animalistic nature to account for human finitude, habitual interacting, and the animating impetus 
for such interacting (Braver again: “Wittgenstein wants to help us face the knotted squalor of the 
real, to force our heavenward gaze down to the detritus of practice”, p. 226). What Braver does 
best is set up previously unconsidered juxtapositions, like this one on Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument: “As Wittgenstein’s ‘private’- linguists can only introspect with public tools, 
so for Heidegger ‘knowing oneself is grounded in being with’” (p. 165).  
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Of course, there are differences between these two philosophical giants which are downplayed in 
Braver’s book for the intended similarities and complementarities. Wittgenstein grounds his view 
of meaning in language games, and apart from referring to these as habit-like, disregards the kind 
of historicism and “care” one finds in Heidegger. Later Heidegger grew increasingly mystical 
and focused on poetic excellence, while Wittgenstein turned his attention more fully on errors he 
saw in the philosophy of science. What Braver has done is tapped obvious and not so obvious 
sources for key insights into where both men shared revolutionary projects of unsettling the 
much idealized ground of modern science. “Groundless grounds” does not refer to an oxymoron; 
it speaks to the historical and cultural arbitrariness and seeming durability of a relational ontolo-
gy that interpretive and other scholars are still coming to terms with.  
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